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When the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the recently reported clusters of micro-
cephaly and other neurologic disorders represent a 
Public Health Emergency of Inter-
national Concern (PHEIC), she 
called for increased research into 
their cause, including the ques-
tion of whether the Zika virus is 
the source of the problem.1 The 
declaration provides an opportu-
nity to step up the pace of re-
search in order to find the an-
swer to some important questions 
more quickly. It could not only 
facilitate the accumulation of 
knowledge about the relationship 
between the Zika virus and mi-
crocephaly, but also accelerate the 
study of newer technologies for 
mosquito control, which could 
have far-reaching effects on 
global health security beyond 
controlling Zika infections.
But to answer these research 
questions effectively and maxi-
mize their contribution to enhanc-
ing health security, we believe it 
is critical that research be conduct-
ed collaboratively. Building and 
strengthening public health ca-
pacities (in part through collab-
orative research) are central to 
the International Health Regula-
tions, an international agreement 
of all WHO member countries 
designed to strengthen health se-
curity.
Yet collaborative research is 
not a given. Collaborative clinical 
and vaccine research during the 
recent Ebola epidemic helped 
some West African researchers 
hone their skills and bring them 
up to global standards for good 
practice. And many of the labora-
tories and other installations pro-
vided by donor countries during 
the Ebola outbreak remain in 
place and are becoming a focus 
for development aid targeted at 
improving public health. But in 
general, collaboration during that 
crisis was suboptimal; in too 
many cases, West Africa became 
a playground for researchers al-
legedly appropriating and trans-
porting specimens and data to 
their home laboratories, some-
times without the knowledge or 
permission of the countries in 
which they were collected.2 An 
initiative to create a coordinated 
network of biobanks and data-
sharing platforms for Ebola and 
other emerging pathogens has 
been launched by Médecins sans 
Frontières (Doctors without Bor-
ders), but it remains to be seen 
whether it will be accepted by the 
research community and contrib-
ute to increased sharing of data 
and specimens.
Research during other recent 
outbreaks and emergencies has 
also been fraught with failures to 
collaborate. Consider the current 
outbreaks of Middle East respira-
tory syndrome (MERS). The coro-
navirus that causes MERS was 
identified nearly 3 years ago, and 
scientists have suggested trans-
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mission links to bats and to 
camels, but it is still not under-
stood how the MERS coronavirus 
is periodically transmitted to hu-
mans from these or other sourc-
es in nature. Studies that could 
help answer such questions have 
not yet been completed, nor have 
their results been shared in a 
way that could lead to preventive 
measures. In some instances, sci-
entists have taken back specimens 
from the Middle East to study in 
their own laboratories, creating 
misunderstandings among re-
searchers and accusations of pub-
lishing data without permission 
from the country of origin.
These practices have been pe-
joratively labeled “parachute” re-
search: fully equipped research 
teams from other countries ar-
rive at the site where research is 
needed, conduct their research 
independently of others, and then 
leave. Parachute researchers reduce 
the effectiveness of emergency 
responses by neglecting to share 
their data with the public health 
teams from the affected country 
in which they’re working, while 
also missing an opportunity to en-
hance the capacity of host-country 
scientists, which could help pre-
vent future outbreaks.
There have already been rumors 
of nonsharing of virus specimens 
and other information during the 
current outbreaks of Zika and 
clusters of neurologic disease, and 
researchers in Brazil who posted 
Zika virus genome sequences in 
an online depository believe that 
a Slovenian research group did 
not adequately credit them when 
it used the data in its own arti-
cle.3 Nevertheless, a consortium 
of journals, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, research funders, and 
institutes recently committed to 
sharing data and results related 
to the Zika outbreak “as rapidly 
and widely as possible” to ensure 
better public health, indicating 
that such data could still be ac-
cepted for publication at a later 
date.4 It is too early to tell, how-
ever, whether the important re-
search recommended under the 
PHEIC will be truly collaborative, 
as some of the Ebola work done 
in West Africa was, or will end 
up being as uncoordinated as re-
search on MERS.
A panel discussion on health 
held at the Munich Security Con-
ference in February — the first 
time that health security has 
been included in the conference’s 
main program — reflects a new 
recognition that health is a criti-
cal aspect of human security. 
The panel did not discuss collab-
orative research. But we believe 
the experience with recent out-
breaks makes clear that if open 
sharing of data and specimens 
becomes the norm among scien-
tists and epidemiologists around 
the world, we will be far more 
likely to succeed in improving in-
ternational public health capacity 
and strengthening our collective 
health — and human — security.
To avoid having to make this 
argument again every time we 
face an outbreak with the poten-
tial for becoming a global crisis, 
we believe the global health 
community should develop and 
agree on a framework of princi-
ples for sharing data and biolog-
ic samples during any such pub-
lic health emergency. It would be 
best if the researchers themselves 
developed such a framework, as 
the genomics community did in 
the Human Genome Project.5 Any 
attempt to develop a best-practic-
es framework will face many po-
tential but resolvable obstacles, 
ranging from political consider-
ations and ethical standards to 
technical feasibility and academ-
ic requirements for publication; 
and international agreements on 
virus ownership such as the Na-
goya Protocol from the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity would 
have to be respected. But imple-
mentation of such a framework 
would be a first step toward new 
rules of the game for all.
Disclosure forms provided by the au-
thors are available with the full text of this 
article at NEJM.org.
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This article was published on March 9, 
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